Richard Whitaker, Simon Hix and Philipp Dreyer
In 2015 we conducted a new survey of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This survey builds directly on surveys of MEPs in the previous three terms of the European Parliament. Many questions have been repeated across all four waves and we added several new questions in this survey. As in the previous surveys, the respondents to our new survey are a good sample of the MEPs, by member state and political group. Details of the sample can be found here. We have written an academic paper presenting the new dataset and setting out the types of questions that can be answered with the data. We have also published a blog post on MEPs’ attitudes to holding all plenary sessions in Brussels. Here we present some of the key patterns in our MEP survey, for a broader audience.
MEPs’ left-right and pro- versus anti-integration positions
Given the presence of greater numbers of Eurosceptic MEPs since 2014, how far have mainstream parties responded to competition from Eurosceptics by altering their approach to European integration in either a more anti- or pro-integration direction? Here we look at data from our 2015 survey of MEPs and earlier data to compare the left-right and EU integration position of MEPs in the last four parliaments. Figure 1 shows the percentage of MEP respondents who placed themselves at each point of the left-right scale.
Figure 1. MEP Left-Right Self-Placement, 2000-2015
Note: higher values indicate more right-wing positions.
The data show that the current EP is a slightly more right-leaning parliament than its three predecessors. While many MEPs are still clustered within the mainstream centre-right, the 2015 survey also has the highest percentage of respondents placing their views at the far-right end of the spectrum (a 10 or 11 on the scale) compared to previous survey waves.
Figure 2 shows MEPs’ responses to a question asking them to position themselves on a scale of support for the integration process in the EU. Here there is some continuity with previous parliaments but also some important differences. The data for 2015 reveal a more polarized parliament. Both the pro- and anti- ends of the spectrum are at their highest levels – by some distance – of all four survey waves. The influx of Eurosceptic MEPs may have caused an intensification of preferences for the more pro-integration members as they react to the hard Eurosceptic message coming from some MEPs. Additionally, external factors such as the economic crisis have put questions of European integration in the spotlight and, while the crisis has generated much Eurosceptic sentiment, it has also resulted in calls for further fiscal or political integration especially within the Euro area. Such policy proposals may account for some MEPs strongly preferring that European integration be pushed further.
Figure 2. MEP Anti-/Pro-EU Self-Placement, 2000-2015
Note: higher values indicate more pro-integrationist views
Should the UK Remain in or Leave the EU?
One new question we asked in the 2015 survey related to MEPs’ attitudes towards the then pending UK “renegotiation” of its EU membership, and whether the UK should then leave or remain in the European Union (EU). Overall support for the UK to leave the EU among MEPs was relatively low with approximately 15% backing Brexit. The majority of MEPs favoured the UK remaining in the EU but strongly opposed any kind of renegotiation of EU treaties. Only 10% of MEPs supported UK-specific renegotiation of the treaties. The survey also asked whether MEPs would support broad renegotiation of the EU treaties on a range of issues including the UK’s concerns. Surprisingly, over 25% of MEPs said they were in favour of broad renegotiations. Figure 3 demonstrates that support for broad renegotiation is highest among the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL). The Eurosceptic political groups Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) and Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFFD) as well as non-attached MEPs almost exclusively backed Brexit. In addition, Spain, France, Poland and Portugal overwhelmingly opposed Brexit as well as renegotiations of the treaties. Demands for broad renegotiations were strongest in the Netherlands and the UK, but even 30% of German MEPs, 25% of Greek MEPs and 20% of Italian MEPs preferred significant changes to EU treaties. Interestingly, only a small minority of British MEPs supported UK-specific treaty renegotiations, whereas the majority of British MEPs was equally divided between backing Brexit or broad renegotiation.
Figure 3: MEPs’ opinions on UK renegotiation of its relationship with the EU, by political group and country
Note: Question asked: The government of the United Kingdom has expressed an interest in re-negotiating the UK’s relationship with the European Union and then holding a referendum on whether the UK should remain in the EU. Are you in favour of continued UK membership in the EU? Please choose one option from the list: 1=Yes, the UK should remain in the EU but without renegotiation; 2=Yes, the UK should remain in the EU but with a broad renegotiation of the treaties on a range of issues including the UK’s concerns; 3=Yes, the UK should remain in the EU but there should be a UK-specific renegotiation of the treaties; 4=No, the UK should leave the EU.
The Spitzenkandidaten Process
The Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidates) process, which was introduced in the 2014 European Parliament elections, saw the major European political groups nominate candidates for the President of the Commission. Regarded as a significant innovation of the EU that may shape the future of the European Commission and European Parliament elections, the Spitzenkandidaten process divides opinions among MEPs. Figure 4 shows that members from the UK, Poland, Portugal and the Netherlands are relatively opposed to the Spitzenkandidaten process. In contrast, support for the procedure is greatest in Greece, Italy, France and Spain. Figure 4 also demonstrates how support for the Spitzenkandidaten procedure varies by political groups. The Eurosceptic political groups EFDD, ENF and ECR are most strongly opposed, whereas the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) and Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) are strongly in favour of the procedure.
Figure 4: MEPs’ attitudes to the Spitzenkandidaten process, by country and political group
Note: Question asked: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? European political groups should nominate candidates for the Commission Presidency in future European elections. Answers: 1=Agree Strongly, 2=Agree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Disagree Strongly. The figure shows the average response for MEPs in each member state and political group.
MEPs’ aims in election campaigning
We also asked MEPs about the primary aims of their electoral campaigns. Figure 5 shows MEPs’ average views on campaigning by country and political group. Larger values on the horizontal axis denote that MEPs predominantly run campaigns by raising the profile of their party, whereas lower values indicate that MEPs emphasise their own profile during campaigns. Figure 5 demonstrates that, on average, MEPs’ primarily aim their campaigning at raising the profile of their party rather than themselves as individual candidates. MEPs from Poland, Italy and Germany lean a little more towards running campaigns on personal platforms, which makes sense for Poland and Italy where preferential voting systems exist. In contrast, MEPs from Spain, the UK, Greece and the Netherlands are more likely to see the primary aim of campaigning as attracting attention to their party. All but one of these cases (the Netherlands) has closed list electoral systems. Eurosceptic political groups as well as the GUE-NGL and non-attached MEPs most strongly emphasise their party, whereas MEPs from the largest political groups, such as the EPP, S&D and ALDE aim to attract attention more for themselves during campaigns.
Figure 5: MEPs’ views on the primary aim of campaigning, by country and political group
Note: Question asked: What was the primary aim of your campaign? Where would you place yourself on this scale?: 0 =to attract as much attention as possible for me as a candidate, 10 =to attract as much attention as possible for my party.
Powers of the European Parliament
The 2015 MEP survey also highlighted differences in positions on a variety of policy areas as well as on the powers of the European Parliament. Figure 6 shows MEPs’ opinions on the EP having equal legislative power with the Council in all areas of EU policy-making and gaining the right of legislative initiative. Opinions on both the EP’s legislative power and legislative initiative tend to be strongly correlated. For example, support for the EP having equal legislative powers with the Council and the right of legislative initiative is strongest among MEPs from Spain, Italy, Croatia and Germany. MEPs from the UK, Poland, Denmark and the Netherlands are most strongly opposed to the EP gaining equal legislative powers with the Council. However, opposition to the EP gaining the right of legislative initiative is comparatively weak in Denmark and Poland. The Eurosceptic political groups ENF, ECR and EFDD as well as the GUE-NGL are most strongly opposed to both the EP gaining equal legislative powers and the right to legislative initiative. Interestingly, non-attached MEPs are neutral on the EP gaining equal legislative powers but heavily opposed to it having the right of legislative initiative. Support for extending both legislative powers of the EP is strongest among the largest political groups, such as the S&D, ALDE, EPP as well as the Greens-EFA.
Figure 6: MEPs’ views on the legislative powers of the European Parliament, by country and political group
Note: Questions asked: To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements about reform of the EU? (a) The European Parliament should have the right to initiate legislation; (b) The European Parliament should have equal legislative power with the Council. Answers: 1=Agree Strongly, 2=Agree, 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Disagree Strongly.
Market regulation
Figure 7 shows MEPs’ positions on extending labour rights regulation (e.g. working time rules) and financial services regulation. MEPs from Denmark, the UK, Poland and the Netherlands believe that there should be a little less labour rights regulation, whereas demands for more regulation in this area are highest in Spain, Italy, France and Germany. Opinions on labour rights and financial services regulations are strongly correlated. One striking exception is the Netherlands, where demand for financial services regulation is high despite opposition to also extending labour rights regulation. The Eurosceptic political groups, such as the ENF, ECR and EFDD are most strongly opposed to both kinds of regulations. In contrast, the S&D, Greens-EFA and ALDE are in favour of extending both labour rights and financial services regulations.
Figure 7: MEPs’ views on extending labour rights and financial services regulations, by country and political group
Note: Questions asked: Do you think there should be more or less EU-wide regulation in the following areas? (a) Labour rights (e.g. Opinion on working time rules); (b) Financial services. Answers: 1=A Lot More, 2=A Little More, 3=About the Same, 4=A Little Less, 5=A Lot Less.
Figure 8 shows MEPs’ positions on discrimination and environmental regulation. As in the previous example, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark are opposed to extending regulation relating to environmental and discrimination issues. MEPs from Poland, Croatia, Germany and France believe that regulation in these areas should remain the same. In contrast, support for extending environmental and discrimination regulation is strongest among MEPs from Spain, Italy and Greece. The Eurosceptic political groups (i.e. ENF, ECR, EFDD) believe that also environmental and discrimination regulation should be downsized significantly. As with the previous example, support for extending environmental and discrimination regulation is strongest among the S&D, Greens-EFA and ALDE, whereas the EPP favour the status quo.
Figure 8: MEPs’ views on extending environmental and discrimination regulations, by country and political group
Note: Questions asked: Do you think there should be more or less EU-wide regulation in the following areas? (a) Discrimination based on gender, race, religion, age, disability, and sexual orientation; (b) Environmental protection standards. Answers: 1=A Lot More, 2=A Little More, 3=About the Same, 4=A Little Less, 5=A Lot Less.
Economic and Monetary Union
We asked MEPs a series of questions about Economic and Monetary Union. Figure 9 shows, first, MEPs’ level of support for allowing governments to run deficits of more than 3% of their GDP and, second, to what extent MEPs believe that the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance is sufficient for ensuring budgetary discipline in the member states. An interesting finding is that MEPs’ positions on both questions seem to be inversely related when summarised by political groups. The GUE-NGL, EFDD, ENF and Greens-EFA support an increase in the maximum deficit-to-GDP ratio and also believe that the Fiscal Compact is sufficient for ensuring budgetary discipline. In contrast, opposition to allowing governments to run deficits of more than 3% is strongest among the EPP, ALDE, ECR and non-attached MEPs. Only MEPs from the EPP and S&D are relatively undecided as to whether the Fiscal Compact is sufficient for ensuring budgetary discipline. Looking at country-level positions, only MEPs from Poland and Germany are strongly opposed to extending the maximum deficit-to-GDP ratio. In contrast, support for allowing governments to run larger deficits is strongest amongst Italian and Danish MEPs. Although support for the Fiscal Compact is generally strong, MEPs from Germany, the Netherlands and Spain are reluctant to agree that it successfully ensures budgetary discipline.
Figure 9: MEPs’ views on extending the maximum deficit-to-GDP ratio and the European Fiscal Compact, by country and political group
Note: Questions asked: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about EMU and EU monetary policies? (a) Governments should be allowed to run deficits of more than 3% of GDP; (b) The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance is sufficient for ensuring budgetary discipline in the member states. Answers: 1=Agree Strongly, 2=Agree, 2=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Disagree Strongly.
Immigration
Immigration has been a salient topic in Europe for a long time, but its relevance to EU policy-making has been further underscored by recent events such as the refugee crisis and Brexit. This section presents some comparisons of MEPs’ positions on several policy questions related to immigration and also looks at changes in these attitudes over time. The last part of this section examines what determines MEPs’ attitudes to immigration-related policy questions. The findings are summarised in Figure 13.
Figure 10 shows MEPs’ responses to questions about, first, whether individual member states should be allowed to place restrictions on the free movement of people into their country and, second, whether EU migrants should be granted the same rights and access to public services as citizens of the recipient member state. Support for restricting freedom of movement is highest in Denmark, Croatia and the UK, and it is lowest in Italy, Spain, Poland and Germany. MEPs from Greece, Spain and Croatia are the strongest supporters of granting EU migrants the same rights and access to public services as citizens of the recipient member state, whereas MEPs from other EU countries have relatively neutral opinions on the issue. Opposition to granting EU migrants equal rights and access to benefits is strongest in the UK. Eurosceptic political groups, such as the ENF and ECR, as well as non-attached MEPs are strongly in favour of restricting free movement and opposed to granting migrants equal rights and access to benefits. In contrast, the S&D, Greens-EFA, ALDE and the EPP resist the idea of allowing individual member states to restrict free movement of people. In addition, the S&D, GUE-NGL and Greens-EFA are also supportive of granting EU migrants equal rights and access to benefits.
Figure 10: MEPs’ views on restricting freedom of movement and migrant access to equal rights and benefits, by country and political group
Note: Questions asked: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about EU Justice and Home Affairs policies? (a) Individual member states should be allowed to place restrictions on the free movement of people into their country; (b) EU migrants should be granted the same rights and access to public services as citizens of the recipient member state. Answers: 1=Agree Strongly, 2=Agree, 2=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Disagree Strongly.
Figure 11 shows MEPs’ positions, first, on establishing a common EU policy on economic migrants from third countries and, second, on enabling the police in each member state to issue arrest warrants across the EU for serious crimes. Responses to both questions tend to be very strongly correlated. A striking exception is the ENF, which strongly opposes a common EU economic migration policy but backs EU-wide arrest warrants. Other Eurosceptic political groups, such as the ECR and EFDD are relatively opposed to a common economic migration policy, but they display more neutral views on EU-wide arrest warrants. Support for a common economic migration policy is strongest among the S&D, EPP, Greens and ALDE. Looking at the country-level, MEPs from Italy, Spain, Greece and Germany are most supportive of establishing a common economic migration policy and of allowing EU-wide arrest warrants for serious crimes. Opposition to a common economic migration policy is strongest in Denmark and the UK.
Figure 11: MEPs’ views on establishing a common EU economic migrant policy and EU-wide arrest warrants, by country and political group
Note: Questions asked: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about EU Justice and Home Affairs policies? (a) There should be a common EU policy on economic migrants from third countries; (b) For serious crimes, the police in each member state should be able to issue arrest warrants across EU. Answers: 1=Agree Strongly, 2=Agree, 2=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Disagree Strongly.
MEPs’ attitudes to establishing a common economic and migration policy by member states show some interesting developments since 2010. Figure 12 demonstrates that support for a common EU economic migration policy has strengthened considerably in Spain, Italy and Sweden, and it has weakened in Romania, the Netherlands and France. MEPs from the UK have continued to be the most opposed to establishing a common economic migration policy.
Figure 12: MEPs’ views on establishing a common EU economic migration policy (2010 and 2015)
Note: Question asked: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement about EU Justice and Home Affairs policies? There should be a common EU policy on economic migrants from third countries; Answers: 1=Agree Strongly, 2=Agree, 2=Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Disagree Strongly.
What determines MEPs’ level of opposition to restrictions on the free movement of people? To answer this question, we carried out a multiple regression analysis that allows us to isolate the effects of particular factors, while taking other things into account. Factors included, among others, are regional divisions, the left-right position of MEPs, the perceived left-right position of party supporters, MEPs’ level of support for further European integration, the frequency of contact with home interest groups and the degree to which MEPs aim to represent the interests of all EU citizens rather than only those of their home country. Figure 13 indicates whether and how strongly each variable influences MEPs’ positions on restricting free movement in the EU. First, MEPs from Eastern Europe tend to take a more anti-free movement position than MEPs from Northern Europe. Opposition to restricting freedom of movement in Western and Southern Europe is not significantly different from Northern Europe. Second, the ideological left-right position of MEPs does not have a significant effect on MEPs’ attitudes to restricting free movement. However, the perceived left-right position of MEPs’ own party supporters is significant in this regard. As MEPs perceive their party supporters to be more left-leaning, the more supportive they are of allowing member states to restrict free movement. Third, MEPs that back further European integration are also more likely to take a pro-free movement position. Fourth, MEPs also become more pro-free movement the more they emphasise the importance of representing the interests of all EU citizens. Finally, MEPs become more in favour of free movement the more frequently they are in contact with interest groups from their home countries.
Figure 13: Determinants of Opposition to Restricting Free Movement (2015)
Note: These are average marginal effects, with 95% confidence intervals shown.
Summary
Several general trends can be observed in our latest survey of MEPs. First our data suggest that the 2014-19 EP is a more polarized parliament than its predecessor. More MEPs are placing themselves at the ends of the pro- versus anti-EU integration spectrum than previously. This, combined with the greater fragmentation of the EP’s party groups, can make forming some of the sorts of coalitions that were common in the previous term, more difficult. While MEPs’ opinions are relatively divided on many issues, there is quite a strong consensus among MEPs from most member states that governments should not be allowed to run deficits of more than 3% of their GDP (except for MEPs from Italy). There is also relatively robust opposition amongst the MEPs to restricting free movement of people (except for the MEPs from Denmark and Croatia). Eurosceptic political groups, such as ENF, EFDD and ECR tend to be more supportive of Brexit, more opposed to the Spitzenkandidaten procedure as well as extending the legislative powers of the European Parliament, more supportive of cutting labour rights, financial services, discrimination and environmental regulation, and more opposed to a common EU economic migration policy compared to other parliamentary groups. Furthermore, MEPs from the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands tend to be more opposed to extending the power of the European Parliament, more opposed to increasing regulations (e.g. environmental, labour rights and discrimination), more supportive of restricting freedom of movement, and more opposed to a common EU economic migration policy and EU-wide arrest warrants in comparison to MEPs from other member states.
For further information about our research, please contact Richard Whitaker (richard.whitaker@leicester.ac.uk) or Simon Hix (s.hix@lse.ac.uk).